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This paper analyses the economic dimension of populist governance in post-crisis Europe by 
exploring whether and in what ways populist economic policies diverge from neoliberal 
orthodoxy. Existing literature on contemporary populism in Central and Eastern Europe is 
ambivalent on this question and lacks systematic analyses of populist economic policies while 
in government. The comparative analysis of the Fidesz-led government in Hungary and the 
Law and Justice government in Poland is used to analyse the policy shifts in different domains. 
The main claim is that a combination of both domestic ideological change at the level of 
government and transnationally conditioned structural factors need to be considered to explain 
the shift towards and the variation in the pursuit of a ‘heterodox’ economic strategy under the 
two populist governments. The paper concludes by offering a reflection on why the analysed 
policy changes do not correspond with a more decisive shift towards an alternative trajectory 
of capitalist development in post-crisis Europe. 
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The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has seen the sweep to power in Europe of four new 
populist governments. First the FIDESZ-led government in Hungary in 2010, then the 
SYRIZA-ANEL government in Greece and the Law and Justice party (PiS) government in 
Poland in 2015, followed by the Five Star Movement-Lega government in Italy in 2018. With 
many other populist parties in Europe either playing a junior role in coalition governments or 
supporting supply and demand partnerships (for example in Austria, Finland and Switzerland), 
a scholarly agenda analysing the policy aspects of populist rule in Europe is slowly emerging. 
While comparative scholarship on populism in Europe has so far focused on the impact of 
populists in power on democracy, the rule of law and immigration policy (Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2012; Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; 
Karolewski and Benedikter 2017), it has neglected the economic policy dimension of populist 
governance in Europe.  
Existing studies of populism in Europe have focused on the economic programmatic 
positions of mostly right-wing populist (or far-right, in some parts of the literature) parties 
while in opposition. Some scholars observed that populist radical right parties in Western 
Europe during the 1990s pursued ‘the winning formula’ of economic liberalism combined with 
xenophobic exclusion to build cross-class coalitions of electoral support (Betz 1993; Kitschelt 
and McGann 1995). By late 1990s, scholars started to note a stronger anti-liberal stance among 
these populist radical right parties when it comes to opposition to free trade and globalisation 
(McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Kriesi et al. 2012). In Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), scholarship finds a far more protectionist and statist orientation in the economic 
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programs of right-wing populist and radical right parties during the post-communist transition 
(Markowski 1997; Mudde 2007). While authors have disagreed on whether economics has an 
important or only secondary, mostly instrumental, place in the political programme of populist 
parties in Europe (see, for example Mudde 2007, ch. 5; Kitschelt 2007, pp. 1181–4), there has 
nonetheless been a common presupposition, at least until recently, that populist parties are far 
removed from political power and, if they do get into power, their electoral promises hit the 
hard wall of economic reality, followed by a fall in electoral support.  
The enduring electoral success of Viktor Orbán’s governments in Hungary since 2010 
and high growth rates under his populist rule dispute this assumption in the literature. 
Following the coming to power of a populist nationalist government led by the PiS party in 
Poland in 2015, initial analyses of the economic policies of the two populist governments have 
noted elements of left-wing economics (in the case of Poland) and market-constraining state 
interventionism (in both cases) (see Kornai 2015; Johnson and Barnes 2015; Szanyi 2016; 
Moses 2017, pp. 147–70; Miszerak and Rohac 2017; Voszka 2018). These developments raise 
the question of the extent of change in the economic strategies of the populist governments 
from the orthodox economic strategies of their predecessors in the region, but even more 
importantly, how to go about analysing the relationship between populism and economics. 
While existing political economy analyses have convincingly documented how contemporary 
populism in Europe arises as a political reaction to neoliberal globalisation (Kalb 2009; Shields 
2012; Saull 2015; Rodrik 2017; Voss 2018; Stankov 2018; Ryner 2018), the international 
political economy literature has so far neglected or underestimated the extent of change 
populist governments can have on the conduct of economic policy. The literature on populism 




In this paper, I will analyse the economic policy dimension of populist rule in post-
crisis Europe by focusing on the economic strategies of Orban’s governments in Hungary and 
the PiS government in Poland, while probing the extent to which they represent a shift away 
from the pursuit of orthodox economic policies by their predecessors. Drawing on analytical 
insights from the political economy of CEE and comparative populism studies, I will argue that 
a combination of transnationally conditioned structural factors (past economic transformation 
legacies; regional and global competition; and the dependent mode of integration into the 
global economy) and ideological change at the level of government need to be considered to 
account for the shift towards market-constraining measures and the variation in the pursuit of 
what I will identify as a ‘heterodox’ economic strategy by the two populist governments. In 
this way, the paper contributes to comparative populism studies in Europe by highlighting the 
structural and institutional hurdles that contemporary populist governments encounter once 
they get to the implementation stage of their economic programmes, as well as to the 
comparative political economy literature in CEE by demonstrating how populism can reshape 
economic strategies through the use of state power and attempt to restructure the pattern of 
integration into the global economy.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. First, I briefly review the economic 
programmatic positions of populists in CEE during the post-communist transition. The next 
section lays out the key analytical building blocks for differentiating between neoliberal and 
post-neoliberal economic strategies. In the following two sections, I provide the empirical 
evidence for the policy shifts in populist economic policies in Hungary and Poland, identifying 
the key similarities and differences, and then explain the heterodox shift in their policies by 
examining the underlying structural factors. The last part summarises findings and assess the 





Political economy of populism in CEE 
 
In the early 1990s, the literature on the post-communist transition in CEE was replete with 
concerns that the recessionary effects of rapid market reforms would provoke the mobilisation 
of populist and authoritarian political forces. This fear was largely based on the experience of 
a wave of popular protests against neoliberal reforms and electoral volatility in Latin America 
in the 1980s (Przeworski 1991; Greskovits 1998). As part of the transformation from 
previously state-controlled planned economies to market economies, post-communist political 
elites in CEE embarked on shock therapy strategy of privatisation, deregulation, trade 
liberalisation and fiscal consolidation (Gowan 1995). Between 1990 and 1991, CEE economies 
contracted by more than 10 per cent and in many recession lasted for more than three 
consecutive years (Milanovic 1998, p. 25). Despite a rise in unemployment, income inequality 
and a fall in real wages, the region did not encounter a reversal of the transition to capitalism 
and liberal democracy by the end of the decade as some scholars expected.  
 The kind of populist policies that many orthodox economists feared were of the type 
seen in Latin America in different periods over the 20th century, which are encapsulated by the 
concept of economic populism. The orthodox position associates populism with specific 
economic policies that emphasise (1) growth and income redistribution, (2) deemphasise the 
risks of inflation and deficit finance, as well as external constraints and the reaction of 
economic agents to non-market policies (Rudiger and Dornbusch 1989; Sachs 1989). Whereas 
the orthodox position equates populism with macroeconomic mismanagement, a heterodox 
position separates macroeconomic mismanagement from microeconomic structural policies, 
such as inward-oriented import-substitution industrialisation or liberalisation (Rodrik 1996; 
Rodrik 2018). Moreover, the heterodox position also recognises the diversity of governmental 
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ideologies and regime types, whether democratic or autocratic, right-wing or left-wing 
populist, that can accompany economic populist policies. During the post-communist 
transition, economic success was measured by the speed and extent of privatisation and 
integration into the global economy, as well as by regulatory harmonisation with the EU acquis 
communautaire by the late 1990s. Any alternative economic policy options that distracted from 
this chartered trajectory were condemned as populist and misguided by the international 
institutions and Western economists.  
Although the 1990s did not bring any radical reversals of the transformation agenda, 
the degree of social dislocation and economic hardship, however, was severe enough to 
produce voter demand for populist politics during the first decade of transition and opened the 
possibility for reshaping the previously pursued transition strategy. In Hungary, an agrarian 
populist Independent Holders’ Party, which formed part of the first post-communist coalition 
government in 1990, called for increased state intervention, market protection and subsidisation 
of products (Bozoki and Sükösd 1993). István Csurka, an MP of the radical right-wing populist 
wing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, warned against the domination of the international 
financial superstructure over Eastern Europe and criticised the foreign-oriented privatisation 
strategy pursued by Hungarian post-communist elites, arguing that it would lead to ‘dependent 
capitalism’ (Greskovits 1998, p. 121). There was also populist backlash in Poland, where the 
Solidarity candidate Lech Walesa used populist rhetoric against parts of the Balcerowicz shock 
programme during the 1990 presidential campaign, in order to defeat a populist nationalist 
Stanisław Tymiński (Weyland 1999, p. 396). While populist backlash did lead to a slowing of 
privatisation in early 1990s, by the end of the decade, a combination of bad macroeconomic 
fundamentals, pressure from international institutions and domestic elite support for ‘a return 
to Europe’ meant that all countries in the region eventually aligned with a foreign-led capitalist 
model of development (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).  
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 Vladimir Mečiar, two-time prime minister in independent Slovakia and leader of the 
largest electoral force Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in the 1990s, was an 
important outlier in the first decade of the transition in that his populist nationalist rhetoric did 
translate into concrete change in the transition strategy pursued. HDZS aspired to building an 
inward-oriented national capitalist model of development by cancelling the second wave of 
voucher privatisation and selling state enterprises directly to Slovak enterprise managers 
(Gould 2003). Between 1994 and 1998, the Mečiar government pursued an active industrial 
policy through large infrastructure projects, a domestic banking sector in service of industry 
and a growing private sector responding to both market price signals and state objectives. This 
was supported by trade liberalisation, welfare paternalism and restrictive macroeconomic 
policy (Haughton 2001; Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Despite criticism from the West for his 
autocratic style of government and suppression of the media, which resulted in a delay in EU 
accession negotiations with Slovakia, the 1998 World Bank report praised the government for 
‘one of the best growth performances in the region’, with the real GDP growing by more than 
6 per cent on average, and bringing inflation down to around 6 per cent, one of the lowest in 
CEE at the time (World Bank 1998, p. ix).  
 The Slovak national capitalist project was abandoned under the reformist Dzurinda 
government from 1998 onwards, which marked the alignment of all CEE economies on state 
FDI-promotion through competitive tax regimes and the transnationalisation of production, 
thus fulfilling a key EU accession requirement (Bandelj 2010; Bohle 2018). In 2000s, the 
literature on populism in CEE notes the predominance of centrist populism, where the emphasis 
is on newness, competence and an anti-corruption agenda, rather than challenging the transition 
policies and offering an alternative economic programmatic agenda (Hanley and Sikk 2016; 
Stanley 2017). Even in the case of radical right-wing populist parties, such as the Law and 
Justice (PiS) party-led coalition government between 2005 and 2007 in Poland, once in 
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government, these parties continued with neoliberal policies, despite discursive sympathy with 
state interventionism and solidarity with the losers of the transition (Szczerbiak 2007: Kalb 
2009; Shields 2012). This seems to have brought the economic policies of populists in CEE 
closer to those in Western Europe by early 2000s, where populist radical right parties have 
combined culturally conservative policies with welfare chauvinism and neoliberal economic 
policies (Mudde 2007; Kriesi et al. 2012), at least until the 2008 financial crisis.  
 Taking the literature on the economic policies of populists in CEE in the 1990s and 
2000s together, and if we exclude the Mečiar case, one could say that populists in government 
have little effect on the change of economic policy. This would also corroborate the thesis in 
the political economy of CEE that governmental ideology does not fundamentally change the 
developmental strategy pursued (Drahokoupil 2009, p. 201), as well as the assumption in 
comparative populism studies that economic issues are only secondary in importance to the 
cultural programmatic positions of populist radical right parties in Europe (Mudde 2007). 
Turning attention of the paper to the economic policy strategies pursued by the Fidesz-led 
government in Hungary after 2010 and the PiS government in Poland 2015, I will instead argue 
that ideological change at the level of government can have an effect on the developmental 
strategy pursued. This will be demonstrated through a systematic analysis of the interplay 
between populist ideas and the corresponding shifts in economic policy.  
 
 
Differentiating between neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism in post-crisis Europe 
 
Before we proceed with case study analysis, I need to provide some analytical clarification as 
to how we can distinguish between different economic policy strategies pursued by populist 
governments and empirically assess the extent to which state policy change marks a shift away 
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from an orthodox economic policy strategy to an alternative one. Although radical populism 
arises in response to neoliberalisation in CEE (Stanley 2017), the economic policy strategies 
of populist parties once in power vary depending on their governmental ideology and the 
structural and institutional constraints that they encounter when implementing policy.  
 Neoliberalisation will be understood as a variegated state-led process of regulatory 
reorganisation in state-economy relations by imposing, extending and consolidating market 
competition in different areas of social and economic life (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 330). A key 
dimension of this process is the emergence of transnational rule-regimes that through 
supervisory and disciplinary power impose restrictive rules of the game on the conduct of 
economic policy. In the CEE context, this process has been supported by domestic political 
elites in conjunction with international financial institutions and the EU with a view to 
increasing the role of transnational markets in CEE economies and thus strengthening EU’s 
competitiveness in the global economy (Meardi 2002; Shields 2012).  
Neoliberal restructuring can be schematically divided into two different phases in CEE, 
which correspond with similar changes in other parts of continental Europe at the time. The 
first transition phase in the 1990s followed the orthodox transitological paradigm: the 
depoliticisation of ownership, the depoliticisation of allocative mechanisms, the marketisation 
of the economy and the imposition of hard budget constraints (Shields 2012, 23–4). This was 
achieved through privatisation, deregulation, trade liberalisation, fiscal consolidation and 
restrictive monetary policy. The second was a phase of neoliberal regulatory deepening, which 
took place from the late 1990s onwards to the 2008 financial crisis. This stage of 
neoliberalisation saw the abandonment of national capitalist projects, liberalisation of 
economies to FDI (mostly from Western Europe), FDI promotion through special tax 
incentives and reduction in corporation tax rates to boost competitiveness (Drahokoupil 2009; 
Bandelj 2010). CEE states also undertook (partial) privatisation of pensions and healthcare, 
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flexibilisation of labour markets, privatisation of strategic economic sectors, such as banking, 
telecommunications and utilities, and regulatory alignment with EU’s single market and 
competition rules in preparation for the 2004 accession (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). As part 
of their preparation for entry into ERM II and Eurozone, they continued with restrictive 
macroeconomic policy and adopted austerity measures and welfare reforms to tackle budget 
deficits (Dyson 2006).  
  Counter-neoliberalisation, on the other hand, involves economic strategies that are 
market-constraining and represent qualitatively different agendas, for example, centred on 
national sovereignty (Brenner et al. 2010). The 2008 financial crisis, followed by the 2010 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe, represented a significant intellectual blow to neoliberal 
economic orthodoxy. Although neo-Keynesian and protectionist approaches to crisis-
management followed, including renationalisation of financial institutions and industry, these 
were only temporary and directed towards salvaging the existing neoliberal model (Bruff 2014, 
pp. 120–1; Voszka 2018). To analytically distinguish between neoliberal and post-
neoliberalism, alternative economic strategies need to be legitimised by a long-term anti-
establishment ideological-state formation and politicise the role of the state in terms of 
ownership, its allocative mechanisms and management of the economy.  
 In concrete terms, economic strategies that involve the following policy shifts will be 
considered as challenging neoliberal orthodoxy in Europe: (1) opposition to Euro adoption and 
tighter economic policy coordination at the EU level; (2) stopping privatisation and re-
nationalisation of strategic economic sectors as part of a long-term developmental strategy; (3) 
greater concern with developmental outcomes and minimising dependence on FDI for 
industrial upgrading; (4) imposition of capital or exchange controls, protectionist measures for 
domestic industry in a discriminatory way; (5) subordination of domestic capital to nationalist 
or redistributive goals; (6) favouring domestic private capital over foreign sources; (7) 
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increased public spending in infrastructure and state aid; (8) loose monetary and fiscal policy; 
(9) increased welfare spending and redistribution; and (10) decommodification or levying of 
selective controls over prices of basic social needs, such as utilities, transportation or housing.  
  When these measures are combined with orthodox measures, for example, continued 
state promotion of FDI, privatisation of strategic enterprises or closer economic policy 
coordination at the EU level under the current EU treaties, the economic strategy pursued will 
be classified as heterodox. The continuation of neoliberal deepening by increasing the power 
of transnational markets and relinquishing of economic decision-making to the supranational 
level will instead be considered as orthodox. The analytical focus should be on the role of the 
state in the economy and how it is legitimised ideologically rather than simply on the amount 
of state intervention, since state involvement is a given in any type of economic strategy 
pursued (Schoenman 2005, pp. 69–70). Furthermore, as structural analyses of post-neoliberal 
economic strategies in Latin America have shown (see, for example, Levitsky and Roberts 
2011; Wylde 2016; Gezmiş 2018), once the extent of the restructuring of economies is taken 
account of, the transformation is not as radical a break from neoliberalism as it first seems. I 
now turn to the two country cases to examine the domestic process of policy shifts in the 
economic strategies pursued and whether they represent a decisive shift towards an alternative 
trajectory of capitalist development.  
 
 
Comparative analysis: Hungary and Poland 
 
Both countries have seen the electoral victory of right-wing populist parties on the back of the 
electorates’ frustration with mainstream political elites and their handling of the economy. 
Viktor Orbán’s FIDESZ party won a two thirds parliamentary majority in alliance with a 
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satellite party the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) in 2010 at the height of the 
financial crisis in Hungary. Such electoral breakthrough was made possible by a preceding 
political crisis, which was triggered by the loss of public support for the governing social liberal 
MSZP party and the unpopularity of fiscal consolidation policies under the technocratic Prime 
Minister György Gordon Bajnai. The FIDESZ-KDNP alliance was re-elected with another two 
thirds majority in 2014 and another in 2018. In Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice 
(PiS) party came to power in 2015 with an absolute majority for the first time since Poland’s 
introduction of full democracy. Despite being the only EU economy to have avoided an 
economic recession since the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, Poland has been 
experiencing a lingering high unemployment rate and widening social and regional 
inequalities. By capitalising on the growing dissatisfaction of the electorate with the post-
communist transition, especially in the Eastern parts of Poland, and politicising the issue of 
material inequality, PiS successfully ousted the centre-right liberal Civic Platform from 
government after eight years in power.  
Both parties’ discourse is staunchly nationalist, anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic. It is 
constructed in a characteristically populist manner where European technocrats, liberal post-
communist elites and globalist forces are pitted against the national interests and values of 
Hungarian and Polish people. They are both scornful of free market economics and of the 
dependent developmental model that their predecessors in respective countries have been 
pursuing during the post-communist transition. Under the Morawiecki economic plan, the PiS 
government identified ‘the middle-income trap’ and an excessive dependency on foreign 
capital as the main challenges for Poland’s future developmental trajectory. To tackle them, 
the government has vowed to stop the privatisation agenda of previous governments and 
reindustrialise and ‘re-polonise’ parts of the economy. A similar nationalist agenda has been 
pursued by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán ever since his 2010 election campaign. 
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In a speech following his party’s electoral victory in 2014, Orbán declared the establishment 
of an illiberal democracy as a key objective of his government to serve as an alternative model 
to Western liberal democracy in the global economic competition: 
 
In my opinion, the most provocative and exciting question surfacing in the Western 
world during the last year can be summarized as follows, applying necessary 
simplification: competition existing among nations in the world, competition existing 
among alliances and forces of the world has been supplemented by a new element… I 
would articulate this as a race to invent a state that is most capable of making a nation 
successful… a state that is most capable of making a nation competitive … [T]he new 
state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny 
foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc. But it does not make this ideology a 
central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular 
approach in its stead. (Orbán 2014) 
 
In the same speech, Orbán pointed to Singapore, China, India, Turkey and Russia as some 
examples of illiberal political regimes, which according to him were making their nations 
successful in the increasingly competitive global economy (Orbán 2014).  
Notwithstanding the shared ideological objectives by the two populist governments in 
Hungary and Poland, I will now examine how the nationalist-populist discourse and ideology 
translated into concrete policy changes and a shift to a heterodox economic strategy. In 
particular, I will focus on the measures undertaken to (1) decrease their dependency on foreign 
capital through the renationalisation of strategic sectors of the economy, (2) their monetary and 




Renationalisation of strategic economic sectors 
 
After coming to power in 2010, Orbán resisted the pressure from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the European Commission (EC) to impose a strict austerity programme on 
public spending and instead started to enact ‘crisis’ taxes on the retail, telecommunications and 
energy sectors, which were dominated by foreign investors. The EC launched infringement 
proceedings against the telecommunications tax, but dropped legal action in 2013 after the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against EC’s claim in a similar tax involving France (US 
Department of State 2014). He also introduced the highest bank levy in the world, mostly 
affecting the large foreign-owned institutions, which more than tripled banks’ tax burden 
(Capelle-Blancard and Havrylchyk 2017). Contrary to other governments in the region, 
Orbán’s government forced the banks to convert the foreign currency mortgages after the 
devaluation of the Hungarian forint during the crisis with the intention of protecting the 
Hungarian mortgage owners. Additionally, the government effectively nationalised the 
mandatory second-pillar private pension fund. While these unorthodox fiscal measures were 
putatively employed to balance the budget and stop government debt from increasing further 
during the European sovereign debt crisis, the government was also adamant to renationalise 
what it identified as the strategic sectors of the economy. By the end of 2017, the foreign 
ownership of the banking sector decreased from 80 per cent to just below 50 per cent, with 
two-thirds of the domestic share owned by the state (EBF 2018). Following the gradual 
enforcement of reductions in utility prices, the government bought privately owned subsidiaries 
of the German utility RWE and the French utility GDF, while other retailers, such as the 
subsidiaries of E.ON and ENI, ceased their operations and handed back their licences to the 
state regulator, further concentrating the state control of the domestic energy sector 
(International Energy Agency 2017).  
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 In some respects, the PiS government in Poland took a less combative approach and 
was more willing to listen to the recommendations of the EC and private investors. Despite 
criticism from the ECB and Poland’s central bank, the government imposed a levy on the 
banking and insurance sectors in 2016 (Matusik 2016). It also introduced a turn-over based tax 
on the retail sector, dominated by big foreign-owned supermarket chains, but the EC later ruled 
the tax was in breach of the EU state aid and competition rules. The PiS government took 
further steps to ‘re-polonise’ the domestic banking sector, which was dominated by the 
subsidiaries of foreign private owned banks, and increased state control from 30 per cent to 
over 50 per cent (Miszerak and Rohac 2017). The government climbed down from its campaign 
pledge to force banks to convert foreign currency loans into zloty and, after fears of 
destabilising the financial system, opted for a less radical measure, requiring banks with 
portfolios of foreign currency mortgages to make quarterly payments into a new mortgage 
relief fund, which would help the borrowers to meet their financial obligations (Moody’s 2017). 
In the domestic energy sector, the government increased its control after the state-owned PGE 
bought the assets that were owned by France’s EDF. Furthermore, the government ordered 
state-run utility companies to reduce or stop paying dividends in order to increase investment 
and help finance government spending needs. Unlike in Hungary, the PiS government only 
nationalised 25 per cent of the assets held by the mandatory second-pillar private pension funds 
(OFEs) and transferred the rest into new mutual funds. However, this measure came on top of 
the previous government’s step in 2014, which nationalised 51.5 per cent of the assets from 
OFEs, mostly government bonds. 
 However, the renationalisation agenda in Hungary did not stop just at what would 
normally be seen as the strategic sectors of the economy in European countries. Orbán’s 
government also nationalised smaller air transport companies, a mass transportation company 
Pécsi Közlekedési Zrt and the telecommunications company Antenna Hungaria amongst other 
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service companies. Moreover, the populist government took control of small firms in the meat 
industry, Hungarian Aluminium, Dunakeszi Vehicle Repairs and the automotive company 
Rába Works (Voszka 2018).  
 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
  
When it comes to macroeconomic policy-making, Hungary can be said to be abiding by fiscal 
discipline while undermining central bank independence, whereas Poland is pursuing a more 
orthodox approach in monetary policy, while in fiscal policy it is diverging from orthodox 
economic principles under the PiS government. Since 2011, Hungary’s government debt-to-
GDP ratio has declined from 79.7 per cent to 73.9 per cent in 2016 and is set to decline by a 
further 3 percentage points by 2019. Following the ‘Structural Reform Programme 2011 – 
2014’ (Ministry for National Economy 2011), this was achieved through fiscal consolidation 
and ‘the declining share of foreign owned and foreign currency denominated debt’ (EC 2018a, 
p. 14). Since 2012, the government has also maintained a government budget deficit below 3 
per cent of GDP, reducing it to -1.9 per cent of GDP in 2016. On the monetary side of policy, 
Orbán’s government appointed his own Minister of Economy, György Matolcsy, as the new 
governor of the central bank MNB in March 2013 after the sitting governor’s term was coming 
to end. Contrary to his predecessor, Matolcsy has been readier to pursue a looser monetary 
policy in order to stimulate the economy and encourage lending, by gradually reducing the key 
interest rate from 7 per cent to 1 per cent in 2016 and maintaining the 3 per cent medium-term 
inflation target. To tackle increased risk aversion and ease credit conditions, the MNB has used 
unconventional monetary policy instruments by restructuring the MNB’s active balance sheet, 
such as introducing the Funding for Growth Scheme (FGS) and the Market-Based Lending 
Scheme (MLS) to support SMEs in accessing credit (Matolcsy 2016, 2017). Through the 
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creation of the Self-Financing Programme, the MNB encouraged banks to invest their excess 
liquidity in liquidity securities and this way contribute to reducing the country’s external 
vulnerability (MNB 2016). 
Compared to Hungary’s innovative monetary policy, Poland under the PiS government 
has maintained a more orthodox approach and refrained from impinging on the independence 
of the central bank NBP. Although the government appointed Adam Glapiński in 2016, a 
former economic advisor to the late president Lech Kaczyński, as the new central bank’s 
governor, the new governor has vowed to maintain a conservative monetary policy and keep 
the key interest rate at 1.5 per cent, while pursuing the medium-term inflation target at 2.5 per 
cent. Since the Great Recession, Poland’s government debt-to-GDP ratio has stayed below 60 
per cent. While the debt ratio was projected to decrease close to 50 per cent under the previous 
government, under the PiS government the debt ratio increased to 54.11 per cent, raising the 
medium-term fiscal sustainability risks. Government budget deficit has been gradually reduced 
under the EU’s excessive deficit procedure to below 3 per cent of GDP in 2015. Under the PiS 
government, however, due to the public spending increases to fund election pledges, the 
structural deficit is predicted to increase (EC 2018b, p. 8, p. 18). This marks a potential shift 




In Poland, the PiS government implemented one of its flagship electoral pledges to increase 
social spending. The ‘Family 500+’ programme, which entered into effect in April 2016, 
disperses a monthly child benefit of 500 zlotys (around £90) to Polish families for every second 
and subsequent child up to the age of 18, as well as to low-income families with one child. The 
policy is justified on the grounds of poor demographic trends and redistributing the wealth 
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created more equally amongst the population. The government also reversed the previous 
government’s unpopular decision to increase retirement age and lowered it back to 60 for 
women and 65 for men. To curb the use of atypical work arrangements, the government has 
introduced a new minimum hourly wage at 13 zloty, which also applies to the much-abused 
civil law agreements that circumvented the existing minimum monthly wage legislation 
(Patocka and Dubiel 2017). 
In Hungary, Orbán’s government has pursued a starkly anti-poor and workfarist agenda. 
Through a constitutional amendment, the government granted power to local authorities to 
criminalise homelessness. Unemployment insurance has been reduced from 9 to a maximum 
of 3 months, compensation for low-income earners has been eliminated and active labour 
market policies have been replaced with a public works programme, which pays at 70 per cent 
of the national minimum wage and is tied to eligibility for social assistance (Szikra 2014). At 
the same time, the government has introduced a family tax allowance for working families, 
where families with two children to the age of 20 were eligible to 35,000 forints (around £100) 
per month in tax credits and 33,000 forints (around £90) per child in bigger families (CEU 
2018). The government has also introduced a flat income tax of 15 per cent, while increasing 
the minimum wage in 2012 by 19 per cent in order to compensate low-income workers (Myant 
et al. 2013, p. 407). Following positive economic growth outcomes and tightening labour 
markets, an agreement was reached with trade unions and employers to further increase the 
minimum wage on an annual basis between 2016 and 2018.  
 
Openness to trade and FDI 
 
Despite introducing new taxes in foreign investor-dominated sectors of the economy, which 
had a negative effect on investor confidence in the short-term, both countries left the 
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automotive manufacturing sector untouched. This is understandable in the context of the two 
countries’ reliance on the German automobile industry for their industrial output.  
To boost foreign direct investment, Orbán’s government lowered the corporate income 
tax to 9 per cent in 2017, the lowest in the EU. This measure came on top of already existing 
generous investment incentives, refundable and non-refundable, in the form of tax incentives, 
low-interest rate loans and land available for free or at reduced prices, as well as negotiation-
based ‘VIP’ subsidy opportunities for investments greater than 10 million euro (HIPA 2017). 
Mindful of the trap of labour-intensive, low-value added manufacturing and the need to 
upgrade to advanced manufacturing and innovation, the government has also introduced 
incentives to support R&D activities and technology-intensive investments. These business-
friendly regulatory changes are in line with the government’s innovation and industrial 
development Irinyi Plan and the objective to bring the industrial output-to-GDP to 30 per cent 
by 2020, while also increasing the number of Hungarian suppliers in the higher value-added 
parts of FDI-controlled supply chains.   
In Poland, the PiS government has rolled out a new system of special economic zones 
(SEZ), where the exemption from income tax for companies that meet specific conditions is 
available throughout Poland for a period of 10 or 15 years. The new system introduces more 
comprehensive eligibility criteria, however, such as the location of the investment, the type of 
investment, the quality of new jobs created, and cooperation with research centres and 
academia. In line with the new ‘Responsible Development Strategy’, the government aims to 
address the middle-income trap by strengthening the position of domestic capital in relation to 
foreign investors and supporting the production of innovative and high-value added products. 
By 2020, the government wants to achieve an increase in industrial output that is higher than 
GDP growth, a 70 per cent increase in Polish FDI and a GDP per capita at 79 per cent of the 
EU average.  
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An important trend in both economies, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, has 
been the increasing foothold of foreign direct investment coming from the East, namely China, 
and Russia in Hungary. This development comes as a diversification strategy for Polish and 
Hungarian exports, but also, as it can be noted in the case of the Hungarian ‘Eastern Opening’ 
strategy, as a sustained effort to decrease economic dependence on Western European investors 
and promote the national interests of the Hungarian economy (MFAT 2017). To this end, 
Hungary has activated the role of the state in assisting the development of the export capability 
of SMEs by creating state-owned trading houses in emerging economies to mediate between 
Hungarian SMEs and foreign buyers (Szunomar 2017). By 2016, Poland has become China’s 
largest trade partner in the CEE region and was the first European country to issue government 
debt in the Chinese bond market (Kuo 2017).  
 
 
The factors behind the heterodox turn and the variation between the two cases 
 
While I have outlined the ideological motivation behind the pursuit of a more nationalist 
economic strategy in Hungary and Poland and the corresponding policy shifts above, structural 
factors also need to be considered to properly account for the heterodox turn and the 
differentiated combination of heterodox economic strategies pursued by the two governments. 
The analysis below focuses on the following transnationally-conditioned factors: (1) past 
economic transformation legacies; (2) regional and global competition; (3) the dependent 
mode of integration into the global economy. 
 Although they followed a similar orthodox economic policy strategy during the post-
communist transition period, the pace, the sequencing and the selective approach to reforms in 
individual CEE countries produced different legacies of economic transformation and patterns 
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of insertion into the European and global economy (Lane 2007; Becker and Jäger 2010; Bohle 
and Greskovits 2012). When comparing the transnationality index,1 which is a useful measure 
of the degree of integration of a particular country within the world economy, Hungary 
consistently had a higher rate of FDI participation (30.1 in 2002, 33.5 in 2005) than Poland 
(around 16 in 2002, around 21 in 2005) in the years leading up to EU accession in 2004 (United 
Nations 2005, p. 16; United Nations 2018, p. 12). This can be explained by faster and more 
extensive privatisation processes in Hungary in the early 1990s, whereas Poland followed only 
in the late 1990s as experimentation with national capitalism failed (Gowan 1995; Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). By the time of the 2008 financial crisis, Hungary’s scale of state ownership 
was smaller than the EU average or when compared to the new EU member states in CEE 
(Voszka 2018). Moreover, the direct control of the state over business enterprises has decreased 
significantly in Hungary between 1998 and 2013, whereas in Poland it has remained almost 
the same during that period (EC 2016, 17).  
Despite both having over 300 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 2012,2 the value added 
of SOEs’ output is higher and more capital intensive in Poland than in Hungary (Böwer 2017). 
Poland still had major state-owned enterprises in the airline, energy, banking, chemical, 
insurance, military, oil and rail industries by the end of its transition, whereas Hungary 
privatised its major state-owned enterprises in the energy sector, manufacturing, food 
processing and chemistry in the 1990s (US State Department 2018; Export.gov 2018). This 
difference in the privatisation strategies during the post-communist transition can explain why 
the Orbán’s regime was more aggressive in its approach to renationalisation of privatised 
companies as part of its economic strategy compared to the PiS government in Poland. 
Moreover, with state-owned stakes in more capital-intensive production, the PiS government 
has been able to put forward a more ambitious developmentally-oriented and sustainable 
industrial strategy by setting out to capitalise on supporting domestic capital in driving 
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innovation and productivity of the economy, in cooperation with foreign investors. Given the 
smaller size of its economy and low levels of private investment after the crisis, Orbán’s 
government opted for lowering the corporate tax rate to the lowest level in the EU, flexibilising 
the labour market and attracting FDI through special tax incentives and strategic partnership 
agreements, while also noticeably increasing public spending in economic affairs since 2010 
due to more extensive involvement in the economy (EC 2018a, p. 13).     
 Another factor behind the varied combination of heterodox economic strategies pursued 
by the two populist governments can be explained by the fact that both countries remain 
embedded in the evolving institutions and processes of (intra-)regional (EU level and within 
the Visegrád group) and global competition for capital accumulation. Here the neoliberal 
regulatory regimes established at the EU level (EU competition law, the single market, EU 
rules on state aid, common trade policy, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the European 
semester) and at the global level (for example, the World Trade Organisation rules and IMF 
conditionality) ensure through supervisory and disciplinary power that member states play by 
the ‘constitutionalised’ rules of market competition (Shields 2012, pp. 89–100; also see Gill 
1998; Soederberg et al. 2005; Schmidt 2015). This is evident in the pursuit of stringent fiscal 
policy by both populist governments under the SGP, although the ideological differences 
between them account for a more welfare-oriented approach of the PiS government in Poland 
and a potential relaxation of its fiscal commitments beyond the EC recommendations. 
Furthermore, by being outside the Eurozone, both Poland and Hungary had more policy room 
in the use of their monetary policy, which was employed in Poland as a strictly crisis-
management strategy, whereas in Hungary currency devaluation came as part of a wider non-
orthodox economic policy after the Orbán-backed central bank governor took over in 2013. 
At the regional level, EU member states also compete in terms of cost-driven regulatory 
competition. This is especially notable in the case of the Visegrád group countries (Poland, 
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Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), which despite strengthening their regional 
cooperation at the political level in recent years, are still in fierce competition for inflows of 
investment capital from Western Europe, the United States and increasingly from the emerging 
economies, most notably China, Russia and India. As privatisation processes wound down by 
the late 1990s, in order to attract FDI in greenfield investments, the Visegrád countries engaged 
in fierce tax competition by lowering corporate taxes and offering generous investment 
incentives (Bohle and Greskovits 2012, 166–72). This trend continued under the Orbán’s 
government in Hungary, as shown above, while the PiS government in Poland overhauled its 
SEZ system and tightened the eligibility conditions around specific socio-economic and 
developmental goals.  
While Hungary and Poland managed to attract FDI in complex manufacturing as a 
result of their privatisation strategies (for example automotive and transport industry) in the 
1990s and regional tax competition in the 2000s, more than half of FDI in manufacturing went 
into low- to medium low-technology intensive manufacturing (for example food processing, 
beverages sectors, consumer durables). Even within the production of high-technology 
intensive industries, CEE countries, including Poland and Hungary, maintain a comparably 
lower R&D intensity in high-technology electronics than the high-income countries of the 
OECD, which shows that CEE countries perform activities in the low value added segments in 
these industries, such as assembly or production of low-cost components (Stojčić and Aralica 
2018, 10; Srholec 2007). Moreover, the bulk of FDI in greenfield investment in the 2000s was 
in the service sector, such as banking, telecommunications and IT services.  
The pursuit of this dependent developmental path based on FDI-led export-oriented 
industrialisation (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Becker and Jäger 2010) proved to be especially 
disadvantageous for CEE countries in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis as investment 
flows and export demand from Western Europe slowed down. Furthermore, unlike Poland, 
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Hungary also showed characteristics of dependent financialisation, as banks relied heavily on 
external financing before the crisis and households accumulated large foreign-denominated 
debts to purchase homes or consumer durables (Becker and Jäger 2010, p. 15; Myant et al. 
2013, p. 403). The position of the two economies in a dependent mode of capitalist 
development is crucial for understanding the heterodox shift in the economic strategies of the 
two populist governments, which accord a more developmental role to the state in their 
industrial policy. Greater prevalence of foreign currency lending and dependence on FDI 
before the crisis can explain a more aggressive approach taken by the Orbán’s governments 
towards renationalisation and more modest aims with regard to Hungary’s reindustrialisation 
policy. With a greater share of domestic capital and state-owned enterprises in high value-
added industries, Poland’s industrial strategy is in a better position to upgrade and climb up the 





This paper has set out to analyse the economic dimension of populist rule in post-crisis Europe 
by examining the cases of populist governments in Hungary and Poland. I have argued that in 
order to account for the heterodox shift in the economic policy dimension of populist rule in 
Hungary and Poland, ideological change in conjunction with the underlying structural 
conditions need to be considered. While ideational factors at the level of government can 
explain the shift towards market-constraining state interventionism in some areas of economic 
policy-making at the national level (banking, energy sector, media), the alternative economic 
strategy is still embedded within neoliberal regulatory frameworks at the EU and global level. 
The dependent position of the two economies at the lower segments of global value chains 
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dominated by foreign investors and the threat of a middle-income trap have been the main 
motivating structural factors behind market constraining measures and more developmentally 
oriented state intervention by the two populist governments. However, these same structural 
conditions have meant the continuation of FDI attraction and their dominance in the automotive 
and electronics industries, retail and telecommunications, despite attempts to thwart market 
competition in the latter two sectors in Hungary.  
 It is important to note that the market-disciplinary power of EU institutions acted as a 
buffer against many of the proposed changes by the two populist governments. Apart from the 
short two-year period in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, during which EU 
member states were given more policy space in their crisis-management strategies, the EU 
institutions have continued to enforce market discipline on member states through the 
excessive deficit procedure, the European System of Central Banks, the European semester and 
legal proceedings (or threat of) at the ECJ, amongst other means. As Bruszt and Vukov (2017, 
p. 666) have noted, whereas ‘the EU has relatively stronger capacities to create and impose 
uniform rules and policies… it has much weaker capacities to anticipate and alleviate negative 
developmental consequences in the less-developed member states’. 3 To take the example of 
the recently unveiled new EU industrial policy strategy, while the strategy provides sector-
specific focus (for example space technology, defence, automotive and steel industries, AI and 
innovation in key enabling technologies) and measures to support industrial policy cooperation 
among EU countries, it is doubtful the extent to which CEE countries will be able to participate, 
given their deficiencies in high-technology production and abolishment of state support for 
leading domestic industries in the run up to EU accession.4 The renationalisation of strategic 
sectors of the economy in Hungary and increased state support for domestic capital in 
innovation and the internationalisation of their exports in Poland can be understood as attempts 
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to address the developmental gaps and catch up with the West in terms of living standards by 
pursuing of a more sustainable growth strategy. 
The findings from my empirical analysis also raise pertinent questions about the extent 
of change that can be achieved by organised political opposition against globalisation and 
neoliberalism, whether they be social democratic, socialist or populist nationalist, from within 
the current neoliberalised framework of international institutions and global production 
networks (see Brenner et al. 2010). The current developments in Hungary and Poland, but also 
in Italy, can be described as forming part of ‘disarticulated counter-neoliberalization’, where 
political forces are enacting (or attempting to) market-restraining or market-transcending 
regulatory strategies at the national level, ‘while still being embedded within geo-institutional 
contexts that are dominated by market-disciplinary regulatory arrangements and policy-
transfer networks’ (Brenner et al. 2010, 341). Considering the continuing economic 
competition between the Visegrád countries and their dependency on FDI for industrial 
upgrading in the CEE region, the longer-term reproducibility and the move towards a more 
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